Annex Q — Elements of a model procedural mandate

Annex 17 of 17 · ≈ 14 min read · 100 paragraphs · section 39 of 40 · search the book

This annex brings together the substantive elements that a procedural referral should contain in order to open the path described in §12.7, and develops §12.7.4. It is not a draft resolution: no session, no agenda item and no authoring State appear in it. A resolution belongs to the delegations that table it, negotiate it, amend it and sponsor it; the author may supply the theory, the evidence, the protocols and drafting elements — he cannot substitute himself for them (§12.7.6). The elements below are therefore drafted to be taken up, modified or set aside.¶ 1

Proposed title — deliberately neutral, so that the process may be owned without endorsing a brand, a doctrine or an organisational chart: “Strengthening institutional continuity in the assessment and responsible management of significant cross-border and intergenerational effects”.¶ 2

Q.1 Design principle: not creating one more commission

The first risk of a referral is not rejection: it is duplication. The system has already produced the 2009 Commission of Experts, the High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity, the 2025 International Expert Commission, and the outcomes of Monterrey, Doha, Addis Ababa and Sevilla. A referral that added one more general commission would reproduce the deficit it purports to correct (Box 9). The mandate must therefore be entrusted to an existing mechanism — the Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, whose function is already to monitor commitments, analyse gaps and advise the intergovernmental process — and accompanied by the following locks.¶ 3

Q.2 Preambular elements

The preambular paragraphs perform three functions: to attach the request to texts already adopted, to delimit expressly what it does not presume, and to place non-duplication before the operative part.¶ 4

Guided by the purposes and principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, respect for the sovereign equality of States and the promotion of economic and social progress,¶ 5

Recalling its resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015, entitled “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”,¶ 6

Recalling also its resolution 69/313 of 27 July 2015, by which it endorsed the Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development,¶ 7

Recalling further its resolution 79/1 of 22 September 2024, entitled “The Pact for the Future”, including the Global Digital Compact and the Declaration on Future Generations annexed thereto,¶ 8

Recalling its resolution 79/323 of 25 August 2025, by which it adopted the Sevilla Commitment, and the renewed mandate of the Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development to monitor commitments, analyse gaps and advise the intergovernmental process,¶ 9

Reaffirming that each State has the primary responsibility for its own economic and social development and that national policies must take account of the priorities, circumstances and capacities specific to each country,¶ 10

Reaffirming also the mandates, competences, independence, privileges and immunities of national and international institutions, in accordance with applicable law and with the instruments governing them,¶ 11

Taking note of the recommendations of the Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, transmitted in document A/63/838,¶ 12

Taking note also of the report of the High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity for Achieving the 2030 Agenda, transmitted in document A/75/810/Rev.1,¶ 13

Taking note further of the 2025 report of the International Expert Commission on Financing for Development, entitled “Financing a Sustainable Future: Proposals for a Renewed Global Development Finance Agenda”,¶ 14

Recognising that this work, together with the successive outcomes of the financing for development process, has already established a substantial body of diagnoses and recommendations concerning the international financial architecture, debt, taxation, cooperation, transparency, financial flows, systemic risks and the needs of developing countries,¶ 15

Stressing that the present process is not intended to constitute a new general reform commission or to reproduce recommendations already formulated without first examining their state of implementation, the institutions responsible and the precise causes of non-implementation,¶ 16

Recognising also that policies, decisions, infrastructure, technologies, financial flows, commercial activities and other actions adopted or authorised in one jurisdiction may, in certain circumstances, produce economic, social, environmental, technological or human rights effects beyond that jurisdiction or on future generations,¶ 17

Recognising further that the international system already has numerous instruments, bodies, financing mechanisms, data systems, oversight procedures and avenues of redress, but that gaps may remain in the continuity between the production of evidence, its qualification, the identification of a duty-holder responsible for the response, financing, prevention, review and redress,¶ 18

Stressing that the existence of an adverse effect does not, in itself, establish exclusive causation, fault, a breach of international law, a net global loss or an automatic entitlement to compensation,¶ 19

Stressing also the need to distinguish between the measurement of an effect, the establishment of its causation, its appraisal in the light of equity and the determination of any legal liability,¶ 20

Conscious of the need to avoid the duplication of mandates, the premature creation of institutions, the proliferation of reporting obligations, disproportionate administrative burdens, the politicisation of evidence and the undesirable effects of insufficiently tested mechanisms,¶ 21

Recognising that a gradual, voluntary, transparent and pilot-based approach may make it possible to assess implementation gaps and to compare different solutions before any decision concerning new permanent or legally binding mechanisms,¶ 22

Stressing the importance of the transparency of methods, the traceability of data, the publication of uncertainties, the possibility of an independent counter-assessment and the effective participation of countries and populations liable to be affected,¶ 23

Recognising also that digital technologies and artificial intelligence may contribute to analysis, while stressing that any official decision must remain under the authority and responsibility of identifiable human persons and institutions,¶ 24

Q.3 Operative elements

The operative part organises an inventory, a gap analysis, voluntary pilots and a return before States. It creates no permanent institution, presumes no liability and establishes no automatic consequence.¶ 25

1. Recognises the value of strengthening, without creating any new legal regime by the present resolution, the continuity between existing mechanisms of measurement, assessment, prevention, response, financing, oversight and redress concerning significant cross-border and intergenerational effects;¶ 26

2. Affirms that the work carried out pursuant to the present resolution is guided by the following principles:¶ 27

(a) respect for the sovereign equality of States, for national ownership, for institutional mandates and for applicable law;¶ 28

(b) priority given to existing institutions and mechanisms where these can perform the required functions in an effective, independent and proportionate manner;¶ 29

(c) the distinction between the measurement of an effect, the establishment of its causation, its appraisal in the light of equity and its legal qualification;¶ 30

(d) the absence of any automatic presumption of liability, compensation, pricing, sanction or jurisdiction;¶ 31

(e) the transparency of data and methods, subject to the applicable rules relating to confidentiality, security, data protection and legitimate property rights;¶ 32

(f) the publication of assumptions, material uncertainties, limitations, dissenting opinions and negative results;¶ 33

(g) proportionality, the possibility of not concluding where the evidence is insufficient and the preference for the least complex institutional solution offering equivalent guarantees;¶ 34

(h) the effective participation of developing countries, affected populations, independent experts and other relevant stakeholders;¶ 35

(i) the maintenance of an identifiable human authority for any public, financial, regulatory or judicial decision;¶ 36

3. Also affirms that nothing in the present resolution modifies the legal mandates, independence, privileges, immunities or decision-making competences of States, central banks, international organisations or other institutions concerned;¶ 37

4. Further affirms that participation in a study, a consultation or a pilot project carried out pursuant to the present resolution constitutes neither an acknowledgement of liability, nor consent to jurisdiction, nor acceptance of any financial obligation other than that expressly agreed to by the participant;¶ 38

5. Decides that the follow-up requested by the present resolution shall be carried out within the framework of the existing mechanisms of the financing for development process and that no independent high-level commission, standing expert group or parallel reporting arrangement shall be created;¶ 39

6. Requests the Secretary-General, through the Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development and within the framework of its existing mandate, to submit to the General Assembly, at a later session to be determined at the time of tabling, a targeted assessment of the implementation and interface gaps concerning significant cross-border and intergenerational effects;¶ 40

7. Also requests the Inter-agency Task Force to integrate this assessment, as far as possible, into the Financing for Sustainable Development Report and into the existing online monitoring arrangements, in order to avoid any new stand-alone series of reports;¶ 41

8. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the assessment includes, before any new proposal, a public tracking matrix of relevant previous recommendations, in particular those of the Stiglitz Commission, the FACTI Panel, the 2025 Ocampo Commission, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the Sevilla Commitment, indicating for each recommendation:¶ 42

(a) its content and its original text;¶ 43

(b) the States, organisations or institutions on which its implementation falls;¶ 44

(c) its state of implementation, in so far as this can be established;¶ 45

(d) the results obtained, the persisting gaps and any unintended effects;¶ 46

(e) the documented reasons for its non-implementation or partial implementation;¶ 47

(f) the institutional, informational, financial or legal interfaces that were lacking;¶ 48

9. Decides that no new recommendation should appear in the assessment without setting out the closest precedent, the specific added value of the proposal, the institution called upon to answer for it, its foreseeable cost, the outcome indicators and the reason why an improvement of existing mechanisms would be insufficient;¶ 49

10. Further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the assessment:¶ 50

(a) maps the existing international, regional and national mechanisms of measurement, reporting, prevention, financing, oversight, dispute settlement and redress;¶ 51

(b) identifies any functional, relational and procedural gaps, in particular at the points of transmission of data, assessments, decisions and challenges;¶ 52

(c) considers as a priority the means of strengthening the coordination, interoperability and accountability of existing mechanisms;¶ 53

(d) compares an improved status quo, federated protocols among existing institutions and, only where justified, specialised mechanisms;¶ 54

(e) explicitly considers the option of creating no new permanent entity;¶ 55

(f) assesses the legal bases, the limits of competence, the procedural guarantees, the costs, the capacity needs and the risks of capture associated with each option;¶ 56

(g) examines the conditions of access of developing countries and affected populations to data, expertise, counter-assessment and review;¶ 57

(h) proposes, where appropriate, a framework of voluntary, comparative and time-limited pilot projects accompanied by pre-established criteria for continuation, simplification, suspension or discontinuation;¶ 58

(i) assesses the benefits, costs and risks of artificial intelligence and other digital technologies, including human oversight, cybersecurity, auditing and operation without artificial intelligence;¶ 59

11. Requests the Inter-agency Task Force to use its existing membership and consultation mechanisms, including contributions from the regional commissions, the international financial institutions, the relevant United Nations bodies, Member States and stakeholders, without constituting a new standing panel or transferring decision-making power to external experts;¶ 60

12. Invites the Economic and Social Council to devote, within the framework of a forthcoming Financing for Development Follow-up Forum, a dialogue session to the interface gaps between the existing mechanisms of measurement, prevention, financing, implementation and redress, drawing on the assessment requested and without establishing a parallel process;¶ 61

13. Invites Member States, the regional commissions, international and regional organisations, the international financial institutions, development banks and other interested entities to submit information on:¶ 62

(a) the existing mechanisms that address cross-border or intergenerational effects;¶ 63

(b) the difficulties encountered in the transmission of data, coordination, participation, financing, implementation and redress;¶ 64

(c) the practices that make it possible to preserve the provenance of data, uncertainty, the reasons given for decisions and the possibility of challenge;¶ 65

(d) the areas in which a voluntary pilot project could bring measurable added value;¶ 66

14. Also invites interested Member States and institutions to propose or host voluntary pilot projects that:¶ 67

(a) bear on a precisely defined material and geographical scope;¶ 68

(b) rely as far as possible on existing institutions and competences;¶ 69

(c) compare the existing procedure with at least one other configuration of cooperation;¶ 70

(d) pre-register their hypotheses, indicators, stopping rules and evaluation methods;¶ 71

(e) preserve the traceability of data, models, uncertainties, objections and human decisions;¶ 72

(f) provide for an independent evaluation and the publication of the results, including where these do not confirm the usefulness of the mechanism tested;¶ 73

(g) entail no pricing, compensation, sanction or legally binding consequence without a separate legal basis and express consent;¶ 74

(h) provide, as appropriate, for the participation and counter-assessment of affected populations;¶ 75

15. Encourages development partners, the international financial institutions and other interested donors to support, on a voluntary basis, the strengthening of the statistical, legal, technological and institutional capacities of developing countries participating in the work;¶ 76

16. Stresses that any financial support for the production or assessment of data must protect the independence of measurement and prevent an entity financing an analysis from determining its results;¶ 77

17. Encourages the entities participating in the pilot projects to provide for procedures allowing the rectification of data, the submission of opposing observations, the review of methods and results, protection against reprisals in accordance with applicable law and the suspension of the mechanism where its costs or risks exceed its demonstrated value;¶ 78

18. Decides that the specific workstream requested of the Inter-agency Task Force shall end upon the submission of the assessment referred to in paragraph 6, unless the General Assembly expressly decides otherwise at a later stage;¶ 79

19. Stresses that the conclusions of the assessment and of the pilot projects prejudge neither the future creation of a body, nor the negotiation of an international instrument, nor the recognition of a legal obligation, nor the acceptance of a dispute settlement mechanism;¶ 80

20. Invites Member States, development partners, the international financial institutions and other interested donors to make voluntary contributions in order to support the implementation of the present resolution, in particular the assessment requested in paragraph 6, the effective participation of developing countries and the counter-assessment of affected populations, on the understanding that such contributions confer on those making them no influence over the findings, methods or conclusions;¶ 81

21. Requests the Secretary-General to seek efficiency gains, to use existing resources and capacities to the fullest extent possible and to present, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, any programme budget implications;¶ 82

22. Decides to consider, at a later session to be determined at the time of tabling, under the item on the follow-up to and implementation of the outcomes of the International Conferences on Financing for Development, the assessment requested in the present resolution and any action that it may be appropriate to take thereon.¶ 83

Q.4 Why an existing mechanism rather than a new commission

Why use the Inter-agency Task Force¶ 84

The Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development already has the functions of monitoring commitments, analysing progress and gaps and advising the intergovernmental process. Its composition makes it possible to avoid reconstituting an external panel. The text entrusts it with a temporary workstream, integrated into its existing publications and forums.¶ 85

Difference from the Stiglitz Commission¶ 86

The Stiglitz Commission had a substantive mandate for the general reform of the international monetary and financial system. The present draft does not redefine that system and does not produce a new general list of policies. It analyses implementation, duty-holders, evidence interfaces and feedback mechanisms.¶ 87

Difference from the 2025 Ocampo Commission¶ 88

The Ocampo Commission proposed a renewed development finance agenda in order to feed into FFD4. The draft resolution begins by examining the translation of that commission’s recommendations and of the Sevilla outcome into responsibilities, useful flows, verifiable data and corrections in the event of drift.¶ 89

Difference from FACTI¶ 90

FACTI bore principally on integrity, transparency, taxation and illicit financial flows. The present draft does not take up its mandate. It requests that its relevant recommendations be integrated into the implementation matrix and that the interface gaps be studied without creating a new specialised panel.¶ 91

What remains open¶ 92

The text settles neither the number of institutions, nor the existence of a jurisdiction, nor the nature of any compensation. It makes it possible to conclude that existing mechanisms suffice, that a federated protocol is preferable or that certain functions must be strengthened. The option of rejection forms part of the mandate.¶ 93

Q.5 Official sources of the texts cited

• A/RES/79/323, Sevilla Commitment — Resolution adopted on 25 August 2025 under the item on the follow-up to the International Conferences on Financing for Development.¶ 94

• A/63/838, Stiglitz Commission — Recommendations of the Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System.¶ 95

• A/75/810/Rev.1, FACTI Panel — Report of the High-Level Panel on International Financial Accountability, Transparency and Integrity for Achieving the 2030 Agenda.¶ 96

• International Expert Commission on Financing for Development, 2025 — Report Financing a Sustainable Future, led by José Antonio Ocampo.¶ 97

• Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development — Existing mechanism responsible for monitoring commitments, analysing gaps and advising Governments; its mandate was renewed by the Sevilla Commitment.¶ 98

• Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2026 — First report of the Task Force since FFD4, centred on the implementation of the Sevilla Commitment and including a mapping of commitments and initiatives.¶ 99

The symbols, the session for submission of the report and the agenda item references are to be confirmed by the sponsoring delegation and the Secretariat at the time of any tabling.¶ 100

@incollection{yaiche_hc_annexe_q,
  author    = {Yaïche, Nizar},
  title     = {Annex Q — Elements of a model procedural mandate},
  booktitle = {The Humanity Compact},
  year      = {2026},
  version   = {2.3},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.22746533},
  publisher = {Zenodo},
  url       = {https://humanitycompact.org/ouvrage/annexe-q/}
}

A book by Nizar Yaïche, former Minister of Finance of the Republic of Tunisia. Who is the author?